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Abstract
I survey recent progress on a classic and challeng-
ing problem in social choice: the fair division of
indivisible items. I discuss how a computational
perspective has provided interesting insights into
and understanding of how to divide items fairly
and efficiently. This has involved bringing to bear
tools such as those used in knowledge represen-
tation, computational complexity, approximation
methods, game theory, online analysis and commu-
nication complexity.
1 Introduction
Fair division is an important problem facing society today
as increasing economical, environmental, and other pressures
require us to try to do more with limited resources. Consider
allocating donated organs to patients, pupils to schools, doc-
tors to hospitals, donated food to charities, or water quotas to
farmers. How do we do this both fairly and efficiently?
Fair division is a problem with a long history. The “di-
vide and choose” mechanism for fair division, for example,
is mentioned in the Book of Genesis when Abraham and Lot
use it to divide the land of Canaan. However, the theoreti-
cal study of fair division dates back only to the end of the
Second World War when it attracted the attention of math-
ematicians such as Hugo Steinhaus, Bronisław Knaster and
Stefan Banach [Steinhaus, 1948]. It later attracted the atten-
tion of economists like Steven Brams and Vincent Crawford
(e.g. [Brams and Taylor, 1996]).
Much more recently, the fair division problem has attracted
the attention of computer scientists, in particular those work-
ing within artificial intelligence. We argue here that this has
led to a range of computational questions to be asked, and
computational tools to be applied, that have advanced both
our understanding of and ability to find fair and efficient allo-
cations. I focus this survey on the fair division of indivisible
goods, but I could have just as easily chosen the fair divi-
sion of divisible goods. An emerging trend, which I discuss
briefly in the conclusion, is to the fair division of indivisible
bads (aka “chores”) and of mixed manna (goods and bads).
2 Formal model
I briefly give some notation and concepts that will be used in
the rest of this survey. We have n agents and m indivisible
items, a1 to am. For each agent i ∈ [1, n] and j ∈ [1,m],
the agent i has utility ui(aj) ≥ 0 for the item ak. We will
mostly limit ourselves to additive utilities where the utility to
agent i for a set of items B is ui(B) =
∑
a∈B ui(a). One
special case of additive utilities is Borda scores where the
jth most preferred item for agent i has utility m − j + 1.
Another special case of additive utilities is lexicographical
scores where the jth most preferred item for agent i has util-
ity 2m−j . We will also mostly consider fair division problems
involving just goods where items have non-negative utility.
This contrasts to bads where all agents have negative utility
for the items. An allocation is a partition of the m items into
n distinguished sets, A1 to An where Ai represents the items
allocated to agent i and Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for i 6= j. We consider
a number of welfare notions for an allocation A1 to An: the
utilitarian welfare which is
∑n
i=1 ui(Ai), the egalitarian wel-
fare which is mini∈[1,n]ui(Ai), and the Nash welfare which
is
∏n
i=1 ui(Ai).
A fundamental fairness notion in fair division is envy-
freeness. The “divide and choose” mechanism mentioned
earlier will return allocations that are envy-free assuming risk
averse agents. An allocation A1 to An is envy-free (EF) iff
for any pair of agents i, j ∈ [1, n] we have ui(Ai) ≥ ui(Aj).
Note that an envy-free allocation may not exist. Consider
two agents that both have positive non-zero utility for a sin-
gle good. A relaxation of envy-freeness for indivisible goods
that can always be achieved is envy-freeness up to one good.
An allocation A1 to An is envy-free up to one good (EF1) iff
for any pair of exists i, j ∈ [1, n] there exists a good ok with
ui(Ai) ≥ ui(Aj \ {ok}).
Another fundamental notion in fair division is Pareto effi-
ciency. We don’t want an allocation which all agents think
can be improved upon or at least not made worse. We say
that an allocation A1 to An is Pareto dominated iff there
is another allocation B1 to Bn with ui(Bi) ≥ ui(Ai) for
all agents i ∈ [1, n] and for one agent j ∈ [1, n] we have
uj(Bj) > uj(Aj). An allocation is Pareto efficient iff there
is no other allocation that Pareto dominates it.
We consider mechanisms that allocate items to agents. For
instance, with the sequential allocation mechanism, agents
take turns to pick an item according to a picking order. This
can implement mechanisms like round robin (aka “draft”)
where agents pick one item each in a fixed order, and this
fixed order is then repeated until no more items are left. An-
other interesting mechanism is the probabilistic serial mech-
anism [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001]. Agents simultane-
ously “eat” their most preferred remaining item at some uni-
form rate. In general, this results in a randomized allocation,
which can be implemented as a probability distribution over
discrete allocations. An important property of mechanisms is
whether they are strategy proof. Do agents have any incentive
to behave strategically? We say that a mechanism is strategy
proof iff it is in the best interests of an agent to act sincerely
(e.g. in the case of the sequential allocation mechanism, to
pick their most preferred item at every turn).
3 Knowledge representation questions
A starting point for much research in AI/CS are questions of
representation and reasoning. How, for instance, do repre-
sent a problem compactly so that we can reason about it effi-
ciently? In fair division, such questions abound. For example,
how do we compactly represent an agent’s preferences over
the power set of different possible subsets of items that might
be allocated so that we can determine tractably an efficient
and fair outcome? This power set of items creates an imme-
diate problem. We need to represent (and elicit) an agent’s
preferences over an exponential number of possible subsets
of items. Often then a domain restriction is supposed like
dichotomous preferences or additive utilities to ensure pref-
erence can be expressed compactly. However, this alone may
not be enough to ensure reasoning is efficient.
For example, Bouveret and Lang [2008] consider simple
dichotomous preferences in which a subset of items is accept-
able or it isn’t and this is specified by (models of) a propo-
sitional logical formula. Even in this simple and compact
setting, deciding if an efficient and envy-free allocation ex-
ists is intractable in general. Disappointingly, this problems
remains intractable under strong domain restrictions such as
identical dichotomous preferences with just 2 agents.
Theorem 1 (Proposition 6 and 7 in
[Bouveret and Lang, 2008]). Deciding the existence of
an efficient and envy-free allocation with general dichoto-
mous preferences specified by models of a propositional
formular is Σp2-complete in general. The problem remains
NP-hard with just 2 agents and identical, monotonic and
dichotomous preferences.
Another common domain restriction is to addi-
tive utilities (e.g. [Bevia´, 1998; Brams et al., 2003;
Chevaleyre et al., 2008; de Keijzer et al., 2009]). Addi-
tive utilities offer a compromise between simplicity and
expressivity. Preferences are now compact to represent
and elicit. However, we can no longer represent certain
settings such as those involving diminishing returns (e.g. a
second bicycle is of less utility to me than the first bicycle)
or complementarities (e.g. the cricket bat is only of value
to me with the cricket ball). Again, reasoning about even
such a compact representation may still be challenging.
For instance, finding an envy-free allocation with addi-
tive utilities is NP-hard even under relatively specialized
conditions such as additive 0/1 utilities [Aziz et al., 2014;
Aziz et al., 2015c].
4 Computational questions
One response to the sort of intractability results discussed in
the last section is to consider simple polynomial time mecha-
nisms for allocating items. Such mechanisms might return a
“good” allocation, even if there is no guarantee of exact op-
timality. Such mechanisms can also address issues like trust
(when they are decentralized) and manipulation (when they
are strategy proof). Consider again the simple sequential al-
location mechanism. Variants of this mechanism are used in
many real world settings such as assigning students to courses
at Harvard Business School [Budish, 2011]. In the sequen-
tial allocation mechanism, agents simply take turns to pick
their most preferred item. Whilst simple, sequential alloca-
tion has some nice theoretical properties. For example, if the
mechanism is operated in a round robin fashion then the allo-
cation returned is guaranteed to be envy-free up to one good
[Budish, 2011].
Such mechanisms for fair division invite a range of com-
putational questions around their application. Consider again
the sequential allocation mechanism. This is not strategy
proof in general. It may not always be in your best inter-
est sometimes to pick sincerely an item that is your most
preferred remaining item. What then is the computational
complexity of computing optimal play (e.g. the subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium of the repeated sequential allocation
game)? This problem remained open for a long time. Brams
and Straffin [1979] first identified this computational question
over forty years ago:
“no algorithm is known which will produce optimal
[strategic] play more efficiently than by checking
many branches of the game tree
It took more than three decades before computer scientists
proved that this computational problem was intractable in
general even under restrictions on preferences of the agents.
Theorem 2 (Theorem 3 in [Kalinowski et al., 2013b]). With
an unbounded number of agents and additive Borda utilities,
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the sequential al-
location game is unique and is PSPACE-hard to compute.
With just two agents, optimal play can be computed in lin-
ear time (Theorem 1 in [Kalinowski et al., 2013b]). Unfortu-
nately, this optimal play may give rather poor outcomes. The
agent not making the final pick can play strategically earlier
in the game to ensure that their opponent taking the last (and
thus only remaining) item has their least preferred item. Their
opponent won’t pick this item given any other choice, but
strategic play will ensure that this is their final choice. The
agent not taking the penultimate pick can play strategically
earlier in the game to ensure that their opponent choosing an
item in this penultimate pick has their least preferred item,
discounting the item that will be picked in the final pick. And
so on for earlier picks. As a result, optimal strategic play
results in agents getting some of their least preferred items.
With three or a larger but bounded number of agents,
the computational complexity of computing optimal play re-
mains stubbornly open (Challenge 5 in [Walsh, 2016]). It was
recently shown that an agent’s best response can be computed
in polynomial time for any bounded number of agents using
dynamic programming [Xiao and Ling, 2020]. This, how-
ever, leaves open the fixed point.
5 Calculation questions
Alongside such computational questions, there are many nat-
ural questions about calculation. For example, how do we
calculate the welfare that agent can expect to have from ap-
plying a given mechanism? What is the probability that an
allocation returned by a given mechanism is envy free? What
is the least utility an agent can get? How do you calculate the
best picking order?
Consider again the sequential allocation mechanism, and a
setting where the preferences of agents are fully independent
(i.e. all possible preference orders are equiprobable and inde-
pendent of each other). Bouveret and Lang [2011] consider
how to calculate the expected social welfare of allocations re-
turned by applying the sequential allocation mechanism in
this setting. They conjecture that calculating the expected
welfare is NP-hard for a range of additive utilities such as
Borda and lexicographic scores given the super-exponential
number of possible preference profiles that need to be con-
sidered. Surprisingly, this conjecture turned out to be false.
Calculating the expected egalitarian, utilitarian or Nash wel-
fare takes only low-polynomial time for any type of additive
utilities (Lemmas 1 and 2 in [Kalinowski et al., 2013a]).
A related question is calculating the picking order that
maximizes the expected social welfare. For small numbers
of agents and items, Bouveret and Lang [2011] calculate the
optimal picking orders to maximize the egalitarian or utilitar-
ian welfare supposing Borda utilities. They conjecture that
calculating the optimal picking order is NP-hard in general.
For two agents and Borda utilities, it was subsequently shown
that the optimal picking order simply alternates between the
two agents.
Theorem 3 (Theorem 1 in [Kalinowski et al., 2013a]). The
expected utilitarian social welfare of the allocation returned
by the sequential allocation mechanism is maximized by the
strict alternating picking order for two agents supposing
Borda utilities and the full independence assumption.
This result holds even if the two agents act strategically
[Kalinowski et al., 2013a]. For three (or more) agents, the
complexity of computing the optimal picking order remains
open. For k-approval utilities (where each agent has k items
with utility 1 and the rest with zero) it is not hard to see that
the strict alternating picking order may not be optimal even
with just two agents. Kalinowski et al. [2013a] conjecture
that the strict alternating picking order is optimal for all con-
vex scoring functions (which includes both Borda and lexico-
graphical scores).
6 Parameterized complexity questions
Another tool in the computer scientist’s toolkit in the face of
intractability is parameterized complexity. Can we identify
parameters under which the computational problem becomes
polynomial? Consider again computing the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium for the sequential allocation game. Recall
that this is PSPACE-hard in general. Strategic behaviour is
only worthwhile when agents have different utilities for an
item. For example, if you value an item that I don’t, you may
strategically delay choosing it since it might still be avail-
able in a later round. We say that an item is multi-valued if
two agents assign it different utilities, otherwise we say that
the item is single valued. Kalinowski et al. [2013b] prove
that, for any number of agents, we can compute a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium in O(k!mk+1) time where k is the
number of multi-valued items, andm is the number of single
valued items. Thus, when the number of multi-value items k
is bounded, the problem is polynomial.
As a second and more recent example, Bredereck et al.
[2019] provide fixed-parameter tractability results for a broad
set of problems concerned with the envy-free and efficient
fair division of indivisible items. For instance, they show that
computing an envy-free and efficient allocation of indivisible
goods is fixed-parameter tractable for the combined parame-
ter of the number of agents together with the maximum value
of the utility of an item supposing additive utilities (Theo-
rem 1 in [Bredereck et al., 2019]). In principle, this implies
polynomial time envy-free and efficient allocations suppos-
ing we have few agents and low maximum utility values.
These results exploit a famous theorem of Lenstra concerning
(the fixed-parameter tractability of) Integer Linear Programs
(ILPs) with bounded dimension. It remains to be shown if the
constructed ILPs are actually easy to solve in practice. As the
authors remark, “algorithms designed for specific problems
usually outperform this approach [ILPs of bounded dimen-
sion] both in theory and practice”.
7 Game theoretic questions
Not surprisingly, game theory provides an important perspec-
tive for fair division. We have already mentioned some com-
putational questions around computing strategic actions. Re-
call, for instance, that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
for the sequential allocation game is PSPACE-hard to com-
puter in general, but linear time when limited to just two
agents. More generally, our understanding of fair division
has advanced by asking questions from the interface between
computer science and game theory.
Consider, for instance, the probabilistic serial mechanism
[Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001]. This is envy free and
Pareto efficient ex ante but is not strategy proof. The probab-
listic serial mechanism is not strategy proof as an agent may
not “eat” their most preferred remaining item if other agents
do not value this item highly, in deferrence to eating earlier
a less preferred item that might otherwise be eaten by other
agents. Although the probablistic serial mechanism is ma-
nipulable, finding an optimal manipulation is in general com-
putationally intractable even if an agent has complete knowl-
edge about the preferences of other agents. Computational
complexity may in this case be a welcome barrier against
agents behaving strategically.
Theorem 4 (Theorems 2 and 3 in [Aziz et al., 2015b]). Com-
puting a best response to the probablistic serial mechanism
game in order to maximize an agent’s expected utility is NP-
hard in general. However, it takes linear time for just two
agents.
More generally, a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to
exist. Not surprisingly, given the complexity of best response,
computing such an equilibrium is NP-hard. Indeed, even
verifying whether the preferences reported by agents consti-
tute a pure Nash equilibrium is coNP-complete (Theorem 3
in [Aziz et al., 2015a]]). On the other hand, with just two
agents, a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in linear
time (Theorem 5 in [Aziz et al., 2015a]]). Pleasingly, this re-
sults in the same outcome as sincere reporting. Thus, whilst
strategic behaviours are easy to compute in the case of just
two agents, they do not change the final outcome.
8 Online questions
Traditional models of fair division usually suppose all
information about the problem is present at the same
time. However, computer scientists are used to deal-
ing with online problems where the problem may be
revealed over time. Indeed, many real world fair divi-
sion problems have such a form with either the agents,
or the resources to be allocated, or both not being fixed
and potentially changing over time (e.g. [Walsh, 2014;
Aleksandrov et al., 2015; Walsh, 2015; Kash et al., 2014;
Mattei et al., 2017; Mattei et al., 2018; Gerding et al., 2019;
He et al., 2019; Aleksandrov and Walsh, 2020]). Consider
allocating deceased organs to patients, donated food to
charities, water rights to farmers, etc. We often cannot
wait till all resources are available, preferences known or
agents present before starting to allocate the resources. For
example, when a kidney is donated, it must be allocated to
a patient within a few hours. As a second example, when
food items arrive at a food bank, they must be allocated to
charities promptly. As a third example, we might have to
start allocating water rights to farmers before we know how
much rain will come. Such online problems introduce a
range of technical and other questions.
First, how do we adapt offline mechanisms to an online
setting? Consider again the sequential allocation mechanism.
Agents take turns to pick their most preferred item. But
what if an agent is not present? Or if it is, their most pre-
ferred item is not? Second, how do adjust normative prop-
erties to take account of the online nature of such fair divi-
sion problems? For instance, Aleksandrov and Walsh [2019]
relax the definition of strategy-proofness to suppose past de-
cisions are fixed while future decisions could still be strate-
gic. This online form of strategy-proofness is less onerous
to achieve. On the other hand, the online nature of such
fair division problems can make other properties harder to
achieve. For example, in offline fair division, Pareto effi-
ciency and envy-freeness are possible to achieve simultane-
ously, e.g. the allocations returned by the probabilistic se-
rial mechanism are Pareto efficient and envy-free ex ante
[Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001]. In online fair division,
however, such a combination is impossible to achieve in gen-
eral.
Theorem 5 (Theorem 9 in [Aleksandrov and Walsh, 2019]).
No online mechanism for fair division is Pareto efficient and
envy-free ex ante.
The reason that efficiency and fairness are not simultane-
ously possible is that the future is uncertain. An online mech-
anism must commit now to an allocation for the current item
which ensures an efficient but possibly not fair future, or a
fair but possibly not efficient future.
9 Asymptotic questions
Another tool in the computer scientist’s toolbox is asymptotic
analysis. Even in the offline setting, desirable fairness prop-
erty such as envy-freeness cannot be guaranteed. Consider
two agents and one indivisible item that both agents value.
However, we can identify online mechanisms that limit how
envy grows over time. For example, [Benade et al., 2018]
consider whether mechanisms can achieve vanishing envy.
That is, afterm items have arrived in an online fashion, if the
maximum amount of envy an agent has for any other agent is
envym, can we design mechanisms so that the ratio of
envym
m
goes to zero as m goes to infinity? This is indeed possible
and, in fact, easy to achieve. [Benade et al., 2018] show that
randomly allocating items gives such an envy ratio that van-
ishes in expectation against an adaptive adversary. Unfor-
tunately, it is not possible to do better than such a “blind”
mechanism. Indeed, this random mechanism is asymptoti-
cally optimal up to logarithmic factors.
Asymptotic analysis can also identify the welfare cost on
insisting on a fair allocation as we let the number of items
grow. For instance, Caragiannis et al. [2009] define the price
of envy-freeness as the ratio between the optimal utilitarian
welfare and the maximum utilitarian welfare of any envy-free
allocation and prove that this grows as O(n) for n items nor-
malized to lie within [0, 1]. Note that this result is for prob-
lems in which an envy-free allocation exists.
Theorem 6 (Theorem 5 in [Caragiannis et al., 2009]). For n
agents, the price of envy-freeness is at least 3n+79 −O(
1
n
).
10 Approximation questions
When faced with an intractable problem, computer scientists
will often look for approximate solutions that can be com-
puted efficiently. This has proved popular in fair division,
starting with the work of Lipton et al. [2004] and an at-
tractive relaxation of envy-freeness: envy-freeness up to one
good (EF1). As noted earlier, the sequential allocation mech-
anism run in a round-robin fashion returns an allocation that
is EF1. Unfortunately, whilst the allocation it returns is EF1,
it may not be Pareto efficient. The mechanism is limited to
allocations in which agents get a similar number of items. It
may, however, be mutually beneficial to swap one item allo-
cated to one agent for multiple items allocated to a second
agent.
Caragiannis et al. [2016] have proposed instead comput-
ing an allocation that maximizes the Nash welfare. Theorem
3.2 in [Caragiannis et al., 2016] proves that this is both EF1
and Pareto efficient. They also prove it provides a good ap-
proximation to another popular (yet sometimes unachievable)
fairness property, the maximin share guarantee. The max-
imin share is the least amount of utility an agent receives if
they divide items into bundles and they get the least valuable
bundle. The Nash welfare mechanism is implemented and in
daily use in the spliddit.org website. This leads Caragiannis
et al. [2016] to conclude:
“. . . the MNW [maximal Nash welfare] solution ex-
hibits an elusive combination of fairness and effi-
ciency properties, and can be easily computed in
practice. It provides the most practicable approach
to date — arguably, the ultimate solution — for the
division of indivisible goods under additive valua-
tions. . . ”
This claim is perhaps a little strong since it is NP-
hard to compute an allocation with optimal Nash welfare
[Nguyen et al., 2014]. As to whether it is the “ultimate” so-
lution, Barman, Murthy and Vaish [2018] recently gave a
pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm for computing an alloca-
tion that is both EF1 and Pareto efficient. In addition this
mechanism provides an 1.45-approximation of the optimal
Nash welfare.
An weaker approximation than EF1 is envy-freeness up to
any good (EFX) [Caragiannis et al., 2016]. This lies strictly
between EF and EF1. An allocation that is EF is EFX, one
that is EFX is EF1, but not the reverse. Intriguingly, it is not
known whether an EFX allocation always exists. There are,
however, some special cases where we know that EFX allo-
cations always exist. For instance, Amanatidis et al, [2020]
prove that an allocation that maximizes the Nash welfare is
always EFX as long as there are at most two possible values
for the goods. With three or more distinct values this impli-
cation no longer holds. As a consequence, an EFX allocation
always exists with two valued goods.
Other fairness properties can be approximated in a similar
way. For instance, another fairness property is proportion-
ality (does an allocation exist in which each of the n agents
get at least 1
n
th of their total utility?). With additive utilities,
envy-freeness implies proportionality (but not vice versa).
Although it is a weaker property, it is not weak enough to
ensure that proportional allocations always exist. However,
PROP1 allocations that are proportional up to one good al-
ways exist [Conitzer et al., 2017]. Indeed, Barman and Kr-
ishnamurthy [2019] have recently given a polynomial time
mechanism for computing an allocation that is both PROP1
and Parto efficient.
11 Communication complexity questions
Another tool in the computer scientist’s toolkit is communi-
cation complexity. Plaut and Roughgarden [2019] initiate the
use of the tools of communication complexity to study fair
division problems with indivisible items. Their primary ques-
tion is to determine whether players need to exchange an ex-
ponential amount of information to compute a fair allocation,
or whether the problem can be solved using only polynomial
communication between the agents. Interestingly there re-
sults show a significant difference between two andmore than
two agents. For more than two agents, exponential communi-
cation is needed to achieve an envy-free or proportional allo-
cation even when randomization is allowed and valuations are
submodular. This exponential continues to hold even when
we demand allocations which are within a constant factor of
envy-free or proportional. With two agents, there are more
promising results. For example, with submodular valuations,
there exists a deterministic protocol to achieve a proportional
allocation with communication that is polynomial in the num-
ber of items.
12 Empirical questions
The final tool in the computer scientist’s toolkit we will con-
sider is empirical analysis. We can code up these mecha-
nisms for fair division and run them on real and synthetic
data. There are many empirical questions that we can then ad-
dress. For instance, how hard are fair and efficient allocations
to find in practice? Even if it is not guaranteed, does a mech-
anism return envy-free allocations with high probability? Do
we observe hard instances around some phase boundary as in
other combinatorial domains like satisfiability?
Such empirical analysis has been driven in part by
access to real world data from websites such as splid-
dit.org [Goldman and Procaccia, 2014] and PrefLib.org
[Mattei and Walsh, 2013]. Computers also make it easy to
generate synthetic data on which to test fair division mech-
anisms. For instance, Dickerson et al. [2014] demonstrate
that there is a sharp phase transition from non-existence
to existence of envy-free allocations, and that finding such
allocations is hardest at that transition. They also prove
asymptotically that, even when the number of items is larger
than the number of agents by a linear fraction, envy-free
allocations are unlikely to exist under modest assumptions
on the distribution of instances. On the other hand, when the
number of items is larger by a logarithmic factor, envy-free
allocations exist with high probability again under modest
assumptions.
13 Conclusions
The computer scientist’s toolbox of questions and methods
has enriched our understanding and ability to fairly and effi-
ciently divide resources between multiple agents. It has let
us identify the computational complexity of finding fair and
efficient allocations, and to seek alternatives such as approx-
imations to envy-freeness like EF1 and PROP1 that can be
achieved tractably when exact methods are intractable in gen-
eral. It has also lead to the identification of parameters that
give fixed parameter tractability. Other tools in the computer
scientist’s toolbox like asymptotic analysis and communica-
tion complexity have also proved useful in understanding fair
division mechanisms. But, as can be expected, applying these
tools and answering these computational questions has led in-
evitably to new and important questions.
One area of recent attention is in the fair division
of bads (sometimes called “chores”), and in the fair
division of goods and bads (sometimes called “mixed
manna”). See, for instance, [Bogomolnaia et al., 2017;
Aziz et al., 2017; Aziz et al., 2018; Aziz et al., 2019;
Bogomolnaia et al., 2019]. The fair division of bads is not
symmetric to the fair division of goods. In particular, giving
no goods to an agent is pessimal, whilst giving no bads to
an agent is optimal. For such reasons, results for the fair
division of goods do not always map onto analogous results
for the fair division of bads.
As well as interesting questions about the fair division of
bads and of mixed manna, there are many other important
open questions puzzling the research community. I shall end
by mentioning just a few:
Do EFX allocations always exist, even with 3 agents and
additive utilities? How do we compute them efficiently?
Are there (computational) phase transitions in other prop-
erties besides envy-freeness? If so, how do their locations
compare?
How do we compute optimal play efficiently for the sequen-
tial allocation mechanism and 3 agents?
Are there other appealing approximations of fairness that
can be achieved tractably (especially in combination with
Pareto efficiency)?
Can we apply other ideas from CS/AI to help us understand
and solve fair division problems (e.g. automated reasoning
methods like SAT for theorem discovery, or machine learning
methods for the design of fair division mechanisms)?
Does a computational lens help us understand and solve
other problems in social choice?
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